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Abstract 
In chapter 1, I provide evidence against the claim in the conventional literature on corporate 
diversification discount that the diversification effect is homogeneous across the industries. I argue that 
the responsiveness of consumer demand to the changing economic conditions or the product demand 
sensitivity is an important characteristic of the industries that should be considered to have a more 
complete understanding of the issue of underperformance of diversified firms compared to single-segment 
firms. Differentiating industries based on the measure of product demand sensitivity, I show that the 
diversification effects are not to be homogeneous across the industries. Much of the value destroying 
effect from the diversification gets reduced when industry experiences any shock or increase in the 
sensitivity of demand. It implies a better shock observing capacity of diversified firms and a source of 
premium that conglomerates can enjoy due to their diversified operations during the periods of the 
increase of sensitivity of product demand. Our result is robust to difference specification and difference 
measure of sensitivity. 
In chapter 2, I include organizational forms as industrial and global diversification, and geographic 
dispersion in the empirical framework to find out which types of diversification do matter for the cost of 
bank loans. I find that firms which are only globally diversified, neither industrially diversified nor 
geographically dispersed, experience higher cost of bank loans. The other types of firms incurring higher 
cost of bank debt are the firms which are only geographically dispersed, and the firms which are 
diversified in all three ways with the combination of geographic, global, and industrial diversification. 
Examining the effects of organizational forms on the non-price loan terms, I observe that covenant 
restrictions are generally higher for the combination of diversified firms which are either both 
geographically dispersed and industrially diversified, or geographically dispersed and globally diversified. 
 
Key words: Corporate diversification, bank loan, Information asymmetry
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Chapter 1: Product Demand Sensitivity and the Corporate Diversification Discount 
1. Introduction 
A large portion of the literature on corporate diversification and firm performance identifies 
diversification as a strategy which destroys corporate value (for example, Lang and Stulz, 1994; 
Berger and Ofek, 1995). To find out explanations of the fact that on an average diversified firms 
are worth less than the portfolios of comparable stand-alone firms, a large body of literature 
focuses on the causes that may affect the cash flow of diversified firms. For example, diversified 
firms may get their values destroyed from the managerial discretion of subsidizing the poorly 
performed division at the cost of withdrawing cash flows from the divisions with better 
performance, which is an inefficient use of internal capital market (Lamont, 1997; Shin and 
Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Whited, 2001; Maksimovik and 
Phillips, 2002), or from the managerial activities which are not optimal according to the 
objective of shareholders (Morck et al., 1990; Servaes, 1996; Denis et al., 1997; Schoar, 2002). 
Or, conglomerates may trade at a discount simply because of the high likelihood of them to be 
formed out of mergers of underperformed firms lowering the expected cash flows (Graham et al., 
2002; Chevalier, 2004).  
The implicit assumptions attached with these papers that the effects of the diversification are not 
to be heterogeneous across the industries was first questioned by Santalo and Becerra (2008), 
where they present the empirical evidence that diversification discount is associated with the 
conglomerates operating in the industries dominated by the specialized firms.  
In this paper, we differentiate the industries based on the product demand sensitivity, or the 
consumer responsiveness of demand to the changing economic conditions and use this 
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characteristic to examine whether the diversification effect varies across the industries and how 
the variation in sensitivity of the industries affect the performance of diversified firms for the 
period of 1992-2010. Such measure of demand sensitivity is important to consider as it can 
capture the fundamentals of market structure that can identify the actual benefits of 
diversification. For example, following the conventional literature, we define a firm as 
industrially diversified if it has operations in more than one 4-digit SIC industry. But diversified 
operations based on this definition of 4-digit SIC industry does not necessarily capture the 
essence the market structure the firms are operating in. If a firm operates in an industry with a 
given level of sensitivity of demand, then a shock or increase in the sensitivity should 
deteriorates the performance of the firms. Such variation in sensitivity is a certain type of 
structure of market to which mostly focused firms should be vulnerable as they are specialized in 
producing of single good. On the other hand, as diversified firms operate in multiple industries, 
any increase in the sensitivity of demand is a problem that conglomerates can manage more 
efficiently than focused firms. For example, suppose a single-segment and muti-segment firms 
both operate in automobile industry from which they absorb some level of sensitivity in demand. 
If the consumers of this particular industry becomes more sensitive to the macroeconomic 
environment, or the consumer responsiveness to the changing economic conditions for the 
automobile industry increases, then the specialized firm has to absorb the full effect of this 
increase of sensitivity, whereas the diversified firm due to its diversified operations should not 
have to be completely exposed to the increased level of exposure to macroeconomic environment 
and should show a better capacity of shock absorption.     
In this paper, measuring the industry sensitivity for each year by beta coefficient from the 
regression of log difference of annual sales of industry defined by different 4-digit level of SIC 
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code on the log difference of annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 years of annual data, we have 
shown that for a given level of sensitivity of demand the firms are exposed to, an increase in the 
sensitivity help the diversified firms to reduce the diversification discount. Actually the value of 
diversified firms compared to the value of specialized firms increase for the rise in the level of 
sensitivity of demand.   
This paper is likely to contribute to the literature of organizational form and corporate 
performance in multiple ways. First, in addition to the work of Santalo and Becerra (2008), it 
provides another evidence for the arguments that diversification effect is heterogeneous across 
the industries. Second, following the recent literature that documents better performance of 
diversified firms during the period of recession or tighter external capital market ((Dimitrov and 
Tice, 2006; Yan et al., 2010; Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010), we further 
enrich this body of literature by providing evidence that improved performance of diversified 
firms are to be generated from their better shock absorption capacity, especially any increase of 
sensitivity of demand harms diversified firms less than their specialized counterparts and rather 
the diversified firms earn some premium due to having diversified operations. Third, based on 
the results of this paper, we can argue for one source of benefits of diversification and that the 
strategy of diversification is not always value destroying. Diversification protects the firms from 
the dire effect of increased level of exposure to the macroeconomic environment and therefore 
they enjoy some premium. Fourth, further based on our findings we can argue for the better 
combination of industries a diversified firm can operate. As it is the diversified level of 
sensitivity or market structure of demand that facilitate the diversified firms manage the 
macroeconomic exposure in a better way, therefore rather than producing goods showing similar 
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level of sensitivity the firms can combine business units showing diversified level of sensitivity 
of demand.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is with a review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature relevant for the arguments of this paper, section 3 has the discussion on the 
hypotheses development, and section 4 is on the data and methodology, section 5 provides the 
discussion on main results and section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theories on Why Firms May Pursue the Strategy of Diversification 
Two key arguments for the corporate diversification provided from the literature are discussed 
below. 
2.1.1. Internal Capital Markets 
One of the major motivations of the firms to diversify is to create internal capital market. 
Through internal capital market, a segment of a conglomerate can use other segment‟s assets as 
collateral and can raise external fund, and also the cross-subsidization can help other segments to 
meet up their investment demands. But the efficiency of cross-subsidization is an issue to 
determine the performance of the diversified firms.  
Diversified firms may suffer from lower valuations due to the inefficient allocation of capital 
across the different segments. For example, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that firms with 
enough free cash flows may tend to overinvest in segments which have poor investment 
opportunities. Also the power struggles among the division managers may be resulted into 
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inefficient allocation of resources by providing more funds to the segments with poor 
opportunities of growth (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000).  In their model, Scharfstein and 
Stein (2000) argue that managers with weaker divisions have a greater incentive to be involved 
in rent seeking activities and these activities induce the CEOs to allocate more funds to the 
inefficient sector.   
On the other hand, some theoretical works show the advantage of the use of fund from internal 
capital market over the external capital market. For example, Stein (1997) argues that unlike the 
outside investors, the CEOs as inside investors have better information about the investment 
prospects of the different segments and thereby they can allocate funds more efficiently.  
2.1.2. Debt Co-Insurance Effect 
The work of Lewellen (1971) provides a financial rationale for diversification. A firm can reduce 
its risk through combining different business segments with imperfectly correlated cash flows. 
This risk advantage of the diversified firms helps them to enjoy a greater access to debt-service. 
The debt co-insurance effect enhances the firm‟s debt capacity which also increases the firm 
value through the achievement of greater tax shield from the substitution of equity with debt 
capital.  
2.2. Empirical Review on the Literature of Corporate Diversification and Performance 
2.2.1. Industry Characteristics and the Effect of Diversification 
Generally studies to analyze the impact of diversification on firm value are performed under the 
implicit assumption that the effect will be same across the industries. But considering the issues 
of technology, market competition, demand structure, etc., the characteristics of the industries 
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should not be similar to each other. There are very few studies which focus on the varying effects 
of diversification across the industries. Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004b) argue 
that even the decision of firms to be diversified depend on the characteristics of industry.  
Santalo and Becerra (2008) emphasize on the importance of considering of the industrial 
characteristics while measuring the value impact of diversification and their empirical findings 
also capture heterogeneous effects of diversification across the industries. According to the 
arguments of Santalo and Becerra (2008), all of the previous studies which examine the general 
effect of diversification fail to account that the competitive advantage from diversification should 
not be same across industries.  
As we know that the potential benefits from diversification comes from the increased economies 
of scope from running multiple segments from different industries (Teece, 1980, 1982), and the 
potential costs come from the greater costs of monitoring (Rajan et al., 2000), these benefits and 
costs should not be necessarily homogeneous across all industries. Rather performance should be 
more dependent on different characteristics inherent to each industry.  
Santalo and Becerra (2008) divide the firms into two groups, firms in industries with at least five 
specialized competitors, and firms in industries with less than five specialists. They find that the 
diversification premium is associated with the latter group, while the former group suffers from 
the diversification discount. Essentially the diversification discount is to be attributed for the 
firms operating in the industries of which market share is dominated by the focused firms.   Their 
study raises doubt on the findings from previous studies which hold the assumption that the 
diversification effects should be homogeneous across the industries.  
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2.2.2. The Importance of Financial Constraints in Considering Diversification Effect 
Billett and Mauer (2003) empirically establish the importance of financial constraints in 
determining the value of internal capital markets. They show that the linkage between firm value 
and internal capital market is driven by the financial constraints. Their work is the first in the 
literature to examine the relationship between firm value and internal capital market directly. 
They decompose their valuation measure into efficient and inefficient cross-subsidies to 
financially constrained and unconstrained segments. They find that excess value increases 
significantly with the efficient subsidies to segments which are financially constrained, while the 
excess value remains unchanged from the efficient subsidies to financially unconstrained 
segments. So their findings suggest that a firm can be benefitted from the internal capital market 
if it can provide funds to the segments with good investment opportunities in the market where 
the focused counterparts of those segments operate under financial constraints. Their finding 
refute the arguments of previous studies that diversification discount comes from the inefficiency 
of the internal capital market. Rather the efficient use of internal capital market and its impact on 
the firm value depend on the extent of financial constraints the firms face if they operate as 
stand-alone entities.  
2.2.3. Performance of Diversified Firms over the Business Cycle 
Some recent papers examine the firm performance during the recessionary period. We know that 
credit constraints are tighter during recessions compared to the periods of nonrecession. Due to 
Lewellen‟s (1971) debt co-insurance effect, focused firms with lower credit quality would face 
increased external finance premium in the market with tighter capital market conditions. 
Following this line of argument, Dimitrov and Tice (2006) hypothesize that during the 
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recessionary periods, focused firms will face higher external finance premiums and also they are 
more likely to become credit rationed. Both of these effects will be reflected through the lower 
rates of investment of focused firms than that of the diversified firms.  
They test their hypotheses by comparing the sales and inventory growth of focused firms with 
diversified firms during the periods of recession. They use sales growth to capture the effect of 
credit constraints on firm pricing output, advertising, and investment strategies, whereas the 
inventory growth is used to capture the fluctuations in credit constraints. Dividing the firms into 
two subsamples, bank-dependent firms defined as the firms which do not have any rating of bond 
and commercial paper, and bank-independent firms are firms with debt-rating, they find that 
bank-dependent focused firms experience a larger drop in sales and inventory growth compared 
to the rival segments of the diversified firms during recession.  
Although Dimitrov and Tice (2006) show the better performance of conglomerates during 
recession, it does not necessarily imply that the investment of diversified firms would be more 
efficient. Yan et al. (2010) investigate the issue of efficient use of internal capital market under 
externally tightened capital market condition and they find that the investment advantage of 
diversified firms persist even after controlling for their better access to external capital market 
and the allocation of internal capital becomes more efficient for the conglomerates under the 
depressed market conditions.  
Hovakimian (2011) also investigate the efficiency issue of the internal capital market and her 
evidence suggests that the diversified firms are likely to use capital efficiently during recession 
by transferring required capital from the low-q segments to high-q segments. This improvement 
of investment efficiency is more pronounced for the financially constrained firms. The evidence 
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reconfirms the Jensen‟s (1986) argument that the binding financial constraints control the agency 
problem of overinvestment by reducing free cash flow under the control of managers. In another 
paper, this issue of efficient use of internal capital market has been examined by Gopalan and 
Xie (2011) with respect to the period of industrial distress and they find that distressed segments 
of the diversified firms show better performance with higher sales growth, higher cash flow, and 
higher expenditure on research and development than single segment firms. Moreover, the 
diversification discount decreases during the distressed period and it almost disappears for the 
firms financially dependent on bank.  
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) focus their analysis of relative performance of diversified 
and focused firms on the recent financial crisis period of 2007 to 2009. They document a 
significant increase in excess value of diversified firms during the recent financial crisis. 
Moreover, a complete disappearance of the diversification discount has been observed at the 
peak of the crisis period, which is the last quarter of 2008. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
So from the above discussion, it should be clear that there are some issues which need special 
attention while measuring the value effect of diversification – 
First, the implicit assumption that the value impact from diversification should be homogeneous 
across the industries should not be necessarily valid. There are several studies which show 
evidence in favor of the claim that the performances of different segments of conglomerates vary 
based on different characteristics of industry like the nature of dominance and number of 
specialized competitors in the industry.  
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Second, as the diversified firms are more likely to be less affected from financial constraints due 
to their internal capital market and less than perfectly correlated cash flows, focused firms should 
be more exposed to the dire effect of industry sensitivity.  
Third – As the performance of diversified firms gets better during the tighter external capital 
market condition or recessionary periods and demand sensitivity diminish away the positive 
benefits associated with diversification, the improved performance during the recession should 
be more pronounced for the firms having less exposure to industry sensitivity.  
Considering the efficient use of internal capital market and debt co-insurance effect, industry 
heterogeneity effects of diversification, and exposure to industry sensitivity as discussed above, 
we can hypothesize that – 
Hypothesis 1: The diversification effect should not be heterogeneous across the industries.. 
Hypothesis 2: Diversified firms should show better level of performance when the industry 
experiences an increases level of sensitivity of demand. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Selection of Sample 
Initially the sample is constructed out of the all firms of which data are available both in 
Compustat Industrial Annual and Segment data files for the period of 1992 to 2010. Then 
following the sample selection criterion of Berger and Ofek (1995), we include the firm-years 
which do not have any segments in the financial service or utility industry (SIC codes 6000-6999 
and 4900-4999) and have at least total annual sales of $20 million. Finally to be included in the 
sample, a firm must have to operate in the industries of which have enough data available to 
calculate each year‟s sensitivity of industry demand.  
 
4.2. Measure of Excess Value 
We use the excess value measure of Berger and Ofek (1995; hereafter BO) to compare the 
performance of diversified firms with the single-segment firms. The comparison is from 
calculating the percentage differences between a firm‟s total value and the segments‟ total 
imputed values as if each segment has a stand-alone entity. Each segment‟s imputed value is 
calculated from multiplying the median ratio of market value to sales of the focused firms 
operating in the same industry by the sales of the segment, whereas the sum of the imputed 
values of the segments is the firm‟s imputed value. Finally the natural log of the ratio of the 
firm‟s actual value to its imputed value is the excess value of sales of the firm. The positive 
excess value implies that there is a diversification premium, meaning that performance of the 
diversified firm is better than that of segments‟ focused counterparts. On the other hand, the sign 
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of the excess value as negative will be an indication of the strategy of diversification as value 
reducing for the firm.  
In calculating the imputed value, we follow BO procedure and we only modify the industry 
definition to comply with the purpose of this study. For example, to calculate imputed value, BO 
broadens the definition of industry whichever can provide at least five specialized firms under 
operation. Such BO procedure of computing the firm performance of a representative industry 
has the potential to create bias in the estimation (Santalo and Becerra, 2008) for which we 
restrict our attention to only 4-digit SIC while computing imputed value. Moreover, such 
modification of industry definition is necessary for our study where we use a measure of 
sensitivity which is based on 4-digit level of SIC. 
Following the fact that some of the firms‟ observations on segments‟ total value using the data 
from Compustat Segment file do not conform with the values reported in the Compustat 
Industrial Annual file, we exclude the firm-years of which segments‟ calculated total values are 
5% more or less than the firms‟ total value. Finally, excess values of which actual values are 
either more than four times or less than one fourth of the imputed value are also excluded.    
4.3. Measure of Diversification 
Following Berger and Hann (2003), we use the Compustat Business Segment file to identify the 
firm‟s status of industrial diversification. A firm with segments operating in more than one 
industry defined by 4-digit SIC code is identified as diversified firm.  
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4.4. Measure of Sensitivity 
According to the literature, there are a number of ways to measure the sensitivity of the 
performance of industry to the change of macroeconomic environment. For example, Petersen 
and Strongin (1996) use the beta coefficient from the time-series regression of percent change in 
real value added in an industry on the real growth rate in gross national product as a measure of 
industry sensitivity. In this paper, to compute each year‟s demand sensitivity of each industry 
defined by Compustat four -digit SIC code, we regress the prior ten to twenty years‟ annual data 
of change in log industry sales on change in log GDP. The beta coefficient from the regression is 
the measure of sensitivity of that particular industry. Then the demand sensitivity at firm level is 
measured from the weighted average beta where the weight is assigned based on the ratio of the 
segment sales to the total sales of the industry or the market share of segments‟ sales. For 
example, for each year t, the sensitivity of each industry i has been measured from the coefficient 
of following regression - 
    (       )           (     )      
where i indexes the industries at 4-digit level of SIC, Y indexes the years from 1 to 20 prior to the 
year of t, and    is the sensitivity of the industry i. After calculating the sensitivity at industry 
level from the above regression, the firm-level sensitivity is calculated as follows – 
                     ∑    
 
   
 
where    is the ratio of the sales of the firm‟s segment in industry i to the total sales of industry i, 
and    is the sensitivity of the industry i.    
14 
 
5. Empirical Results    
5.1. Summary Statistics 
For each industry, as identified from unique 4-digit SIC code, the sensitivity for a particular year 
is measured from the beta coefficient calculated from regressing the previous ten to twenty years 
of annual data of log difference of industry sales on the log difference of GDP. Table 1 shows 
the mean values of the industry sensitivity over the sample period of 1992-2010. Although we 
compute our measure of sensitivity based on 4-digit SIC, for the convenience of presentation in 
the table 1 the industries are redefined based on the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry 
classification. Some of the industries are missing as we exclude observations of firms from the 
financial and utility industry. 
Some of the industries which show the highest level of sensitivity are Restaurants, hotels, and 
motels, agriculture, steel, electrical equipment, metallic and industrial metal mining. Sensitivity 
is found to be very low for the industries like tobacco products, guns, candy and soda etc. We 
also compute an alternative measure of sensitivity using total market sales in place of GDP in the 
regression of which beta we use in our robustness tests as to be discussed in the following 
section.  
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Table 1: Product Demand Sensitivity of Industry 
Each year‟s industry sensitivity is measured by the beta coefficient stored from regressions of the log difference of quarterly sales 
of industry defined by different 4-digit SIC on the log difference of the quarterly GDP using the last five years‟ quarterly 
observations. The table provides the mean value of the sensitivity over the sample years of 1992-2010 using the Fama and French 
(1997) 48-indsutry classification. 
Industry Sensitivity Industry Sensitivity 
Agriculture 4.41 Healthcare -1.91 
Aircraft 1.91 Machinery 1.89 
Apparel 0.13 Measuring and Control Equipment 0.71 
Automobiles and trucks 1.44 Medical equipment 0.22 
Beer 1.47 Metallic and industrial metal mining 2.66 
Business services 0.17 Other 20.10 
Business supplies 1.18 Personal services 1.32 
Candy & soda -0.33 Petroleum and natural gas 2.42 
Chemicals 0.74 Pharmaceutical products -2.34 
Coal 1.33 Printing and publishing 1.00 
Communication 0.17 Recreation -0.55 
Computers 0.52 Restaurants, hotels, motels 4.16 
Construction 1.11 Retail 0.51 
Construction materials 1.38 Rubber and Plastic Products 1.11 
Consumer goods -0.12 Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 2.65 
Electrical equipment 3.01 Shipping containers -0.84 
Electronic equipment 1.68 Steel 3.63 
Entertainment 0.17 Textiles -0.90 
Fabricated products 1.86 Tobacco products 0.05 
Food products -0.41 Transportation 1.92 
Gold -0.82 Wholesale 0.63 
Guns -0.07   
 
The summary statistics as presented in the table 2 indicate some important characteristics of 
diversified firms which are significantly different from their specialized counterparts. As 
expected following the previous literature, the mean excess values based on sales of the 
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diversified firms are lower than the focused firms and difference between the two values are 
significant. An interesting case to observe from the table that the mean weighted demand 
sensitivity of diversified firms is two times more than that of focused firms which imply that 
diversified firms are highly exposed to the variations of macroeconomic performances. In terms 
of total assets and market capitalization, diversified firms are much larger than focused firms as 
expected. The sign and significance of the difference of median values between the diversified 
and focused firms are similar to the findings using mean values except for the ratio of 
CAPX/sales.  
 
Table 3 reports the mean values of excess value of sales and weighted demand sensitivity of 
focused and diversified firms for each sample year. Except the year of 2008, the excess values of 
specialized firms come out as higher than the excess values of diversified firms in every year of 
the sample period. On the other hand, multi-segment firms appear to have higher values of 
weighed demand sensitivity than single-segment firms in most of the sample years, which 
indicate the diversified firms‟ substantial involvement in the production of sensitive goods.   
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
In this table, market capitalization is the fiscal year-end stock price multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding, total capital is the sum of market value of equity and the 
book value of debt, excess values based on sales are calculated following the methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995) except that industries only at 4-digit level of SIC have been 
used in the calculation of imputed value, weighted demand sensitivity for the firm-year is calculated from the sum of each segment‟s corresponding industry sensitivity weighted 
by market share of the sales of segment whereas industry sensitivity is the beta coefficient from the regression of log difference of annual sales of industry on the log difference of 
the annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 years of observations, number of segments shows the number of industries the firms are operating in, CAPX/sales if the ratio of capital 
expenditure to sales, EBIT/sales is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales, industry sensitivity is the beta coefficient from the regression of log difference of annual 
sales of industry on the log difference of the quar GDP using the past 20 quarters‟ observations, total capital is the market value of common equity plus book value of debt, 
Standard t-test is used to test the equality in means. To measure the statistical significance, t-statistics are used for the differences in mean values and Wilcoxon rank sum test 
statistics are employed for the differences in median values. The symbols ***, **, * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
  Full Sample Single-Segment Firms Multi-Segment Firms Difference 
  Mean 
(1) 
Median 
(2) 
STD 
(3) 
Mean 
(4) 
Median 
(5) 
STD 
(6) 
Mean 
(7) 
Median 
(8) 
STD 
(9) 
Mean 
(4-7) 
Median 
(5-8) 
Total Assets ($ millions)  1940.070 232.944 7112.320 1613.830 215.916 5963.130 4836.480 481.831 13218.530 -3222.650*** -265.915*** 
Market capitalization ($ 
millions) 
 2597.490 261.741 11898.480 2157.250 247.569 10147.140 6506.050 474.827 21623.030 -4348.800*** -227.258*** 
Total capital ($ millions)  3112.290 342.668 13024.070 2600.760 321.694 11126.490 7653.710 609.595 23532.460 -5052.950*** -287.902*** 
Excess value of sales  -0.014 0.000 0.588 -0.001 0.000 0.589 -0.132 -0.131 0.571 0.131*** 0.131*** 
Weighted demand 
sensitivity 
 0.038 0.003 0.412 0.035 0.003 0.395 0.069 0.005 0.540 -0.035*** -0.002*** 
Number of segments  1.121 1.000 0.392 1.000 1.000 0.000 2.199 2.000 0.478 -1.199*** -1.000*** 
Capx/Sales  0.120 0.043 0.287 0.123 0.043 0.299 0.093 0.047 0.148 0.030*** -0.005*** 
Ebit/sales  0.045 0.069 0.273 0.043 0.069 0.281 0.063 0.075 0.182 -0.020*** -0.006*** 
Obs   21,574  19,390 2,184   
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Table 3: Excess value and weighted demand sensitivity of diversified and focused firm by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table shows the mean excess value based on sales and weighted demand sensitivity of diversified and focused firms by year 
and the differences in mean-values. A firm is to be defined as diversified if it operates in more than one 4-digit SIC industry. 
Excess values based on sales are calculated following the methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995) except that industries only at 
4-digit level of SIC have been used in the calculation of imputed value , weighted demand sensitivity for the firm-year is 
calculated from the sum of each segment‟s corresponding industry sensitivity weighted by market share of the sales of segment 
whereas industry sensitivity is the beta coefficient from the regression of log difference of annual sales of industry on the log 
difference of the annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 years of observations. The symbols *, **, *** indicate the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
Year Excess value  Weighted demand sensitivity 
Focused 
Firm 
(1) 
Diversified 
Firm 
(2) 
Difference 
(1-2) 
 Focused Firm 
(3) 
Diversified 
Firm 
(4) 
Difference 
(3-4) 
1992 0.039 -0.124 0.163**  0.023 0.090 -0.067 
1993 0.033 -0.109 0.143**  0.017 0.120 -0.103* 
1994 0.032 -0.177 0.209***  0.012 0.121 -0.109* 
1995 -0.002 -0.231 0.230***  0.022 0.149 -0.127*** 
1996 -0.008 -0.142 0.134**  0.013 0.151 -0.138*** 
1997 -0.015 -0.144 0.129***  0.014 0.123 -0.109** 
1998 -0.031 -0.076 0.045  0.049 -0.062 0.111*** 
1999 -0.022 -0.144 0.123**  0.042 0.035 0.007 
2000 -0.034 -0.248 0.214***  0.033 0.030 0.003 
2001 0.026 -0.077 0.103*  0.031 0.032 -0.001 
2002 0.017 -0.015 0.032  0.042 0.036 0.005 
2003 0.029 -0.169 0.198***  0.024 0.059 -0.035** 
2004 0.005 -0.223 0.228***  0.030 0.047 -0.017 
2005 -0.014 -0.193 0.179***  0.045 0.083 -0.037 
2006 0.005 -0.223 0.228***  0.053 0.056 -0.002 
2007 -0.023 -0.071 0.048  0.052 0.099 -0.046 
2008 -0.005 0.070 -0.075  0.060 0.056 0.005 
2009 -0.020 -0.114 0.094  0.050 0.073 -0.023 
2010 -0.014 -0.125 0.111*  0.080 0.154 -0.074** 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix  
This table reports the pairwise correlations between the variables used in the analysis. Excess values based on sales are 
calculated following the methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995) except that industries only at 4-digit level of SIC have 
been used in the calculation of imputed value, weighted demand sensitivity for the firm-year is calculated from the sum of 
each segment‟s corresponding industry sensitivity weighted by market share of the sales of segment whereas industry 
sensitivity is the beta coefficient from the regression of log difference of annual sales of industry on the log difference of the 
annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 years of observations, diversified is a dummy variable equals one if a firm operates in 
more than one 4-digit SIC industry, log(assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets, CAPX/sales if the ratio of capital 
expenditure to sales, EBIT/sales is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales. P-values are reported in the 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
 Excess 
value of 
sales 
Weighted 
demand 
sensitivity 
Diversified Log(Assets) Capx/sales EBIT/sales 
Excess value of sales 1.000      
Weighted demand 
sensitivity 
0.016** 1.000     
Diversified -0.067*** 0.025*** 1.000    
Log(Assets) 0.191*** 0.116*** 0.137*** 1.000   
Capx/sales 0.136*** 0.002 -0.031*** 0.153*** 1.000  
EBIT/sales 0.054*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.171*** -0.019*** 1.000 
 
We report the results of pairwise correlations between the variables important for this analysis in 
the table 4. It shows that there is a significant positive correlation between the measure of 
weighted demand sensitivity and excess value of sales. Relationship between the diversification 
and excess values of sales is negative which implies that diversification is likely to destroy value.  
In table 5 we try to show the variations of weighted demand sensitivity of single-segment and 
multi-segment firms across the different level of exposure to macroeconomic fluctuations. To 
achieve this goal we first make a quintile ranking of industry sensitivity computed from the beta 
coefficient of the regression of industry sales growth on the GDP growth using the past 10 to 20 
years of observations for each year and then track the number of segments of a firm operating in 
the different level of sensitive industries. For example, Level 1 represents the industries which 
are least responsive to economic environment, whereas Level 5 represents the industries which 
have shown the highest level of sensitivity to the movements of economy. After the construction 
of quintile ranking for the sensitivity of industries for each year we figure out the proportion of 
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segments of a firm operating in each level of sensitive industries. At level 1 the proportion 
greater >0, >0.5, =1 mean that at least 1 segment, more than 50% of the segments, and all of the 
segments of the firm respectively operate in the least sensitive industry. Thereby using the 
distribution of each firm‟s segments at different level of sensitive industry for each year, in table 
5 we show the sample average values of weighted demand sensitivity or the sum of sensitivities 
weighted by segments‟ shares of sales in the firm in each year. We can see that except two cases 
in the level 1 sensitivity the diversified or multi-segment firms consistently show higher values 
of the weighted demand sensitivity. Especially this evidence of higher values of sensitivity of 
diversified firms is more pronounced for the case of firms operating in the level 5 industries 
which implies that the multi-segment firms compared to the single-segment firms are highly 
exposed to the sensitivity of industries.  
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Table 5: Sensitivity of single-segment and multi-segment firms  
This table reports the pairwise correlations between the variables used in the analysis. Excess values based on sales are calculated following the methodology of 
Berger and Ofek (1995) except that industries only at 4-digit level of SIC have been used in the calculation of imputed value, weighted demand sensitivity for the 
firm-year is calculated from the sum of each segment‟s corresponding industry sensitivity weighted by market share of the sales of segment whereas industry 
sensitivity is the beta coefficient from the regression of log difference of annual sales of industry on the log difference of the annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 
years of observations, diversified is a dummy variable equals one if a firm operates in more than one 4-digit SIC industry, log(assets) is the natural logarithm of 
total assets, CAPX/sales if the ratio of capital expenditure to sales, EBIT/sales is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales. P-values are reported in the 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
  Single-
segment 
 
 Multi-segment 
 
 Difference 
Proportion of number of 
segment operating in 
different level of sensitive 
industries 
  >0 >0.5 =1  
1-2 1-3 1-4 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
Level 1 (Least sensitive)  -0.114  -0.054 -0.151 -0.117  -0.059** 0.037 0.003 
Level 2  -0.007  0.020 -0.021 -0.022  -0.027*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
Level 3  0.034  0.096 0.161 0.129  -0.062*** -0.127*** -0.096*** 
Level 4  0.056  0.126 0.139 0.139  -0.069*** -0.083*** -0.082*** 
Level 5 (Highly sensitive)  0.191  0.194 0.519 0.477  -0.003 -0.328*** -0.287*** 
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5.2. Main Results from Regressions 
To test our hypothesis that whether the performance of diversified firms compared to that of 
specialized firms are to be varied with the level of sensitivity of industry they are exposed to and 
whether the diversification effect is heterogeneous across industries, whereas the sensitivity of 
product demand has been used to measure the industry characteristics, we run firm fixed effects 
models using different specifications and show the results in table 6. In this table, our main 
interest lies on the relationship between the excess value and the interaction between the 
diversification dummy and the weighed demand sensitivity. We document a significant 
diversification discount in the column 1 by observing the negative coefficient of “Diversified”. 
Our main interest lies on the coefficient of the interaction term of diversified and the weighted 
demand sensitivity in column 3 from where we document a significant and positive effect of the 
interaction term on the excess values of sales, which implies that for a given level of exposure to 
the economic fluctuations through operations in the industries with certain level of sensitivity, 
further increase in the sensitivity help the diversified firms to perform better than their 
specialized counterparts. From this result we can see how economic diversification adds value to 
firms. 
As we restrict our criterion of selecting matching firms for the calculation of imputed value to 4-
digit level of SIC, we try to observe whether the premium that we document in table 7 still 
continue to show in case of broadening the level of SIC. For example, in column 3 of table 7, 
rather than using 4-digit level of SIC we use 3-digit SIC in calculating of imputed value and we 
find that interaction effect between diversification and sensitivity gets stronger with the use of 
broader level of SIC. In case of the use of 2-digit level of SIC the considerable effect of 
interaction term still continue to exist.   
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Table 6: Relationship between the demand sensitivity and the performance of diversified firms 
The table shows the results from the regressions to capture the diversification effects on firm performance controlling 
the demand sensitivity. The dependent variable is excess value of sales which is calculated following the methodology 
of Berger and Ofek (1995) except that industries only at 4-digit level of SIC have been used in the calculation of 
imputed value. “Diversied” dummy is a dummy variable equals one if a firm-year is diversified, whereas a firm-year is 
diversified if it has operations in multiple industries defined by different 4-digit level of SIC code, weighted demand 
sensitivity for the firm-year is calculated from the sum of each segment‟s corresponding industry sensitivity weighted 
by market share of the sales of segment whereas industry sensitivity is the beta coefficient from the regression of log 
difference of annual sales of industry on the log difference of the annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 years of 
observations, log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets, EBIT/sales is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to sales, Capx/sales is the ratio of firm capital expenditure to sales. Standard errors of columns 1 and 2 are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and of columns 3 and 4 are both heteroscedasticity and panel robust and are reported in 
the parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Diversified -0.123*** 
(0.025) 
-0.115*** 
(0.025) 
-0.116*** 
(0.025) 
Weighted demand sensitivity   -0.006 
(0.025) 
Diversified*Weighted demand 
sensitivity 
  0.044** 
(0.024) 
Log(Assets)  -0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
CAPX/sales  0.298*** 
(0.039) 
0.298*** 
(0.039) 
EBIT/sales  0.075** 
(0.034) 
0.075** 
(0.034) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.50 0.50 
Obs 21,574 21,574 21,574 
 
A peril of the fixed effect model especially can be a concern for our sample is that we are likely 
to fail to account the diversification effect for the firms which maintain their status of 
diversification through the whole period of sample. For this type of firms in an effort to capture 
the “within” variation in the fixed effects model we lose of the observation which never changed 
their position of diversification. To overcome this difficulty we apply an approach of two stage 
regressions where we run regression of excess values of sales on the control variables in the first 
stage. Then we collect the residuals generated from the regression of first stage as a dependent  
24 
 
Table 7: Excess value based on different level of SIC digit 
The table shows the results from the regressions to capture the diversification effects on firm performance controlling the demand 
sensitivity. The dependent variable is excess value of sales which is calculated following the methodology of Berger and Ofek 
(1995) except that industries only at 4-digit level of SIC have been used in the calculation of imputed value. “Diversied” dummy 
is a dummy variable equals one if a firm-year is diversified, whereas a firm-year is diversified if it has operations in multiple 
industries defined by different 4-digit level of SIC code, weighted demand sensitivity for the firm-year is calculated from the sum 
of each segment‟s corresponding industry sensitivity weighted by market share of the sales of segment whereas industry 
sensitivity is the beta coefficient from the regression of log difference of annual sales of industry on the log difference of the 
annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 years of observations, log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets, EBIT/sales is the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales, Capx/sales is the ratio of firm capital expenditure to sales. Standard errors of 
columns 1 and 2 are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and of columns 3 and 4 are both heteroscedasticity and panel robust and are 
reported in the parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
 4-digit SIC 
    (1) 
3-digit SIC 
     (2) 
2-Digit SIC 
     (3) 
Diversified -0.116*** 
(0.025) 
-0.107*** 
(0.025) 
-0.108*** 
(0.027) 
Weighted demand sensitivity -0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.003 
(0.024) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
Diversified*Weighted demand 
sensitivity 
0.044** 
(0.024) 
0.049** 
(0.023) 
0.039** 
(0.020) 
Log(Assets) -0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.011) 
CAPX/sales 0.298*** 
(0.039) 
0.319*** 
(0.043) 
0.366*** 
(0.046) 
EBIT/sales 0.075** 
(0.034) 
0.063* 
(0.036) 
0.047 
(0.038) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.55 0.61 
Obs 21,574 21,574 21,574 
 
variable and the diversification dummy, weighted demand sensitivity, and the interaction term of 
diversification and weighted demand sensitivity as the independent variables. Results from the 
second stage regression as shown in table 8 reassert the findings that the shock or increase in the 
sensitivity of product demand help the diversified firms to perform better. Further in column 3 of 
the table 8 to account the influence of time-invariant or rarely changing variables we use a 
specification of random effects model suggested by Mundlak (1978). Following the specification 
of Mundlak (1978) we simply add additional terms in the random effects model to control for the 
between effect. The model can be written as – 
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  Table 8: OLS results from two-stage regression  
The table shows the results from the regressions to capture the diversification effects on firm performance controlling the 
demand sensitivity. The dependent variable is excess value of sales which is calculated following the methodology of 
Berger and Ofek (1995) except that industries only at 4-digit level of SIC have been used in the calculation of imputed 
value. “Diversied” dummy is a dummy variable equals one if a firm-year is diversified, whereas a firm-year is diversified if 
it has operations in multiple industries defined by different 4-digit level of SIC code, weighted demand sensitivity for the 
firm-year is calculated from the sum of each segment‟s corresponding industry sensitivity weighted by market share of the 
sales of segment whereas industry sensitivity is the beta coefficient from the regression of log difference of annual sales of 
industry on the log difference of the annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 years of observations, log(Assets) is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, EBIT/sales is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales, Capx/sales is the ratio of firm 
capital expenditure to sales. Standard errors of columns 1 and 2 are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and of columns 3 and 4 
are both heteroscedasticity and panel robust and are reported in the parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate the 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
 Second-stage Second-stage Mundlak Formation 
Intercept 0.004 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.433*** 
(0.029) 
Diversified -0.040 -0.042*** 
(0.009) 
-0.131*** 
(0.014) 
Weighted demand sensitivity  -0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
Diversified*Weighted demand 
sensitivity 
 0.035*** 
(0.013) 
0.047** 
(0.022) 
Log(Assets)   -0.003 
(0.005) 
CAPX/sales   0.298*** 
(0.016) 
EBIT/sales   0.075*** 
(0.014) 
Mean(Log(Assets))   0.075*** 
(0.007) 
Mean(CAPX/sales)   -0.098*** 
(0.039) 
Mean(EBIT/sales)   -0.077* 
(0.044) 
Mean(Weighted demand 
sensitivity) 
  0.010** 
(0.028) 
Mean(Diversified*Weighted 
demand sensitivity) 
  -0.232*** 
(0.082) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes NA 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.062 
Obs 21,574 21,574 21,574 
 
                ̅       (      ) 
where     represents the time-varying variables,  ̅  is the group means of time varying variables 
to control for the correlation between the random effects and regressors,    is the time-invariant 
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variable or the variable rarely changes over the time which is the diversification dummy in our 
model. Here    captures the within effect, and  ̅  control the between effect. We find the 
diversification much higher using this specification. Also the interaction effect shows strong 
positive effect on the excess values of sales.      
Further to check how much robust our findings is, we use an alternative measure of sensitivity 
where we employ yearly figure of total market sales in place of annual GDP in the regression to 
calculate the sensitivity at industry level. One rationale for the use of this measure could be that 
while GDP contains value added by all industries in the economy including financial and utility 
sector, the aggregate market sales of the industries captured for the analysis should be a better 
measure to capture the sensitivity of sales of an industry to the variation in total sales in the 
market. Table 9 shows the results from the regressions using the alternative measure of 
sensitivity. The premium gets much larger in all specification using this different measure.  
6. Conclusion 
This is the first study to document the effect of industry sensitivity on the performance of firms 
with different organizational forms. The results of this paper suggests that the variations in the 
consumer‟s responsiveness to the changing economic condition for the demand of goods and 
services have important implications to assess the performance differentials demonstrated by the 
firms with different organizational forms. In addition to the work of Santalo and Becerra (2008), 
we provide further evidence against the implicit assumption imbedded with the conventional 
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Table 9: Alternative measure of sensitivity  
The table shows the results from the regressions to capture the diversification effects on firm performance 
controlling the demand sensitivity. The dependent variable is excess value of sales which is calculated following 
the methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995) except that industries only at 4-digit level of SIC have been used in 
the calculation of imputed value. “Diversied” dummy is a dummy variable equals one if a firm-year is diversified, 
whereas a firm-year is diversified if it has operations in multiple industries defined by different 4-digit level of 
SIC code, weighted demand sensitivity for the firm-year is calculated from the sum of each segment‟s 
corresponding industry sensitivity weighted by market share of the sales of segment whereas industry sensitivity 
is the beta coefficient from the regression of log difference of annual sales of industry on the log difference of the 
annual GDP using the past 10 to 20 years of observations, log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets, 
EBIT/sales is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales, Capx/sales is the ratio of firm capital 
expenditure to sales. Standard errors of columns 1 and 2 are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and of columns 3 and 
4 are both heteroscedasticity and panel robust and are reported in the parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate 
the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
 4-digit 
  (1) 
3-digit 
   (2) 
2-digit 
  (3) 
Second-stage 
       (4) 
Mundlak 
    (5) 
Intercept    0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.445*** 
(0.029) 
Diversified -0.119*** 
(0.025) 
-0.109*** 
(0.026) 
-0.109*** 
(0.027) 
-0.044*** 
(0.010) 
-0.130*** 
(0.014) 
Weighted demand sensitivity -0.053 
(0.058) 
-0.031 
(0.058) 
0.006 
(0.051) 
-0.015*** 
(0.014) 
-0.054 
(0.037) 
Diversified*Weighted 
demand sensitivity 
0.137 
(0.085) 
0.134* 
(0.079) 
0.072 
(0.070) 
0.080** 
(0.040) 
0.143** 
(0.066) 
Log(Assets) -0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.037 
(0.011) 
 -0.003 
(0.005) 
CAPX/sales 0.297*** 
(0.039) 
0.318*** 
(0.043) 
0.366*** 
(0.046) 
 0.297*** 
(0.016) 
EBIT/sales 0.075** 
(0.034) 
0.064* 
(0.036) 
0.047*** 
(0.038) 
 0.075*** 
(0.014) 
Mean(Log(Assets))     0.077*** 
(0.007) 
Mean(CAPX/sales)     -0.101*** 
(0.039) 
Mean(EBIT/sales)     -0.078* 
(0.044) 
Mean(Weighted demand 
sensitivity) 
    0.018 
(0.066) 
Mean(Diversified*Weighted 
demand sensitivity) 
    -0.585*** 
(0.165) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes NA NA 
Adjusted R2 0.503 0.548 0.610 0.001 0.063 
Obs 21,574 21,574 21,574 21,574 21,574 
 
literature of corporate diversification discount that diversification effect is homogeneous across 
the industries. We find that diversification effect varies with the variation of sensitivity of 
consumer demand in the economy. Especially any shock or increase in the consumer 
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responsiveness to the demand let the diversified firms to use their greater shock absorbing 
capacity and enjoy a diversification premium.  
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Chapter 2: Organizational Forms and the Contracts of Bank Loans 
Introduction 
Literature suggests that organizational forms such as industrial diversification or 
internationalization does matter for the cost of bank loans (for instance, Hann et al., 2013; Franco 
et al., 2013; Demirkan et al., 2012; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Li et al., 2011). Another important 
type of firm‟s effect which has not yet received any attention in the literature is the 
geographically dispersed firms‟ effect on bank debt (firms with subsidiaries located to multiple 
regions in the United States).  
This paper is the first attempt in the literature to include three important forms of organizations 
and all possible combinations of organizational forms in the empirical setting which have the 
advantage of identifying the exact types of firms that influence the cost of external finance. 
Using the data of firm and loan characteristics over the period of 1994-2009, we find that 
globally diversified firms, or the international firms which are industrially focused and 
geographically concentrated face higher cost of bank loan. The cost is also significantly high for 
the non-international single-segment firms with subsidiaries located in multiple regions of the 
United States or the firms which are only geographically dispersed. Our findings further suggest 
that banks are less likely to favor the firms which contain all forms of diversification under their 
organizational structure or which are globally, industrially, and geographically diversified. We 
also examine the effects of organizational forms on the non-price loan terms and find that 
covenant requirements are higher for the geographically dispersed firms which are also either 
industrially or globally diversified. 
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There are many ways our paper contributes to the literature of cost of debt and different types of 
diversification. First, we are the first to consider geographic dispersion in measuring the impact 
on the cost of bank loans. Based on the findings of previous literature indicating that the 
geographic dispersion is to be associated with valuation discount and more prevalence of agency 
problems (for instance, Landier et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2008), we can predict a positive 
relationship between the geographic dispersion and the cost of debt. Confirming our prediction 
we find that firms which are only geographically dispersed, neither industrially nor globally 
diversified, experience a high cost of bank loan.  
Second, although there are several papers which empirically examine either the effect of 
industrial diversification, or the effect of internationalization on the bank loan contract, there are 
no papers that examine the effects of all types of diversification to determine which effects are 
ultimately responsible in influencing the cost of loans. In this paper, we consider all three types 
of diversification for analysis to find out which forms of organizations that the banks are mainly 
concerned of in devising of loan contract. Third, besides considering three forms of organization, 
we also include all combinations of organizational structure in the analysis, which is very 
important because of a large portion of firms which are globally diversified are also industrially 
diversified or geographically dispersed. For example, around 21% of the sample of firm-year 
observations is both geographically and globally diversified, and around 10% is both industrially 
and globally diversified. Firm-years which are diversified at every form of diversification or both 
geographically dispersed, and globally and industrially diversified covers 20% of the 
observations in the sample. We find evidence of higher cost of bank loans for the globally 
diversified firms and for the geographically dispersed firms. Another combination of 
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organizational forms that experiences significantly higher cost of bank loans is the organizational 
structure which is diversified in all the forms being considered.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the theoretical and empirical 
review on the literature of organizational forms and the cost of capital. Data and methodology of 
the paper are presented in section 2. The empirical finding is discussed in section 3 and section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
1. Review of the Literature on Organizational Forms and the Cost of Debt 
1.1. Industrial Diversification and the Cost of Debt 
Lewellen (1971) argues that the lower variability of earnings that a firm achieves from the 
aggregation of different business segments with imperfectly correlated streams of cash flows can 
reduce the expected default rate. Such coinsurance effect might help the diversified firms to 
achieve capital at a lower cost. Moreover, banks may suffer from diseconomies of scope created 
by monitoring disincentives or by deteriorating quality of credit if they diversify their lending 
portfolio into the industries of which they have had very little prior experience in dealing with or 
into the industries which are very competitive (Acharya et al., 2006). Such monitoring 
disincentives and lack of experience can be overcome by lending to the diversified firms. These 
firms can help the banks monitor and collect information from a firm operating in multiple 
industries under the control of a single management team.  
On the other hand, managers of diversified firms may tend to be involved in an inefficient use of 
internal capital markets through cross-subsidization between divisions (Meyer et al., 1992; Rajan 
et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), whereas higher controlling power of the managers on 
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on the level of resources to allocate across the business segments may increase the agency costs 
as argued by some authors (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lamont and Polk, 2001). These theories 
imply that lenders who are concerned about the agency problems of the diversified firms can 
increase the cost of borrowing. 
Empirically, Hann et al. (2013) find that diversified firms on average enjoy a significantly lower 
cost of capital than comparable portfolios of focused firms. Also they show that the advantage of 
cost of capital of the diversified firms is positively related with the debt coinsurance effect. 
Franco, Urcan, and Vasvari (2013) find a significant negative relationship between the bond-
offering yields and the degree of industrial diversification, whereas the relationship gets stronger 
for the firms with higher quality of segment disclosures. In another recent paper focusing on the 
debt contract, Aivazian, Qiu, and Rahaman (2013) show that the loan rates are significantly 
lower for the diversified firms than their stand-alone counterparts.  
1.2. International Diversification and the Cost of Capital 
Multinationals have the potentials to bring completeness to the market by facilitating the 
investors with an indirect access to the foreign capital, the points which are nicely presented by 
Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984). Especially banks facing strict regulations and entry barriers 
can diversify their lending portfolios by simply investing in multinationals. Such positive 
financial effects should be appreciated by banks offering favorable loan contracts to the 
internationally diversified firms.   
Foreign banks in establishing a financial contract may want the multinationals to pledge 
collateral, which can be demanded by lenders often to reduce the information asymmetry as 
studies show (John et al., 2003; Sufi, 2007). The collateral facility that a multinational can 
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provide to their foreign lender can obtain funds at a lower cost as it provides greater incentive for 
the lender to monitor and increase the transparency.  
There are some risks to which internationally diversified firms can be exposed such as exchange 
rate risk and political risk (He and Ng, 1998; Reeb et al., 1998) which may increase the 
borrowing cost. Agency problems associated with the firm internationalization can be another 
source that makes borrowing cost higher (Lee and Kwok, 1988). The cost increases with the 
degree of internationalization because the international activities are likely to impose constraints 
from geographical and cultural distances and from legal complicacies due to the operations of 
MNCs under different legal systems (Burgman, 1996).  
Most of the papers which empirically examine the relationship between international 
diversification and the cost of capital are focused on the issues of cost of equity. One of the very 
few papers which consider the cost of debt in particular is Reeb et al. (2001) where they find 
evidence of negative relationship between the degree of corporate international diversification 
and the cost of debt capital. Whether the relationship is monotonic is asked by Reeb and Mansi 
(2002) and they find that the lowering cost of debts captured by bond yield spreads attribute to 
the early stage of international activity and on average the cost decreases by 13%.  
Li et al. (2011) conduct a comprehensive study to observe whether the creditors‟ evaluation on 
internationally diversified firms gets reflected through the bank lending activities. Their finding 
of a negative relationship between the degree of corporate globalization and bank loan spreads 
confirm the prediction that bank favors the multinationals.  
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1.3. Geographic Dispersion and the Cost of Capital 
Physical distance impairs the option of the use of personal means as a very important source of 
information. Essentially the soft information collected from the personal communication can 
impound such a knowledge of which quality cannot be found in hard data. Due to physical 
distances among subsidiaries, geographically dispersed firms are mostly devoid of soft 
information which can be collected only through the means of personal communication and they 
have to heavily depend on the quantified information (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). That is why 
distance is often employed to capture the essence of information asymmetry in the literature 
(Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001).  
Lenders being concerned of the absence of high quality information or soft information may 
charge a higher cost of loan for the dispersed firms. The importance of physical proximity for the 
firms‟ access to capital has been echoed in a large body of literature on banking which argue that 
proximity in the locations of borrowers and lenders are correlated with the possibilities of any 
lending relationship to take place (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; 
Agrawal and hauswald, 2010). Especially for the cases where the use of soft and private 
information comes out as a necessary component in devising an efficient contract between the 
lenders and borrowers, lenders are more likely to be in financial contract with the firms closer to 
them. The role of proximity in reducing the information asymmetry between lender and borrower 
can have a positive implication for the firms to be able to achieve capital at a lower cost.   
As distances make an obstacle to collect soft information, divisions which are proximate to 
headquarters may attract unwarranted attentions from managers paying more favorable attention 
to them. This is especially true for the industries where soft information cannot be transferred 
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into the form of quantified data easily. For instance, Landier et al. (2007) find out that the 
decisions of layoffs are less likely to take place for the divisions which are closer to the 
headquarters. The relationship of proximity-layoff gets weakened for the firms operating in the 
industries where it is relatively easier to quantify information. More recently, Gao et al. (2008) 
show that the geographic dispersion deteriorates the firm performance. Such type of evidence 
suggests that banks are more likely to charge a higher cost of loan for the geographically 
dispersed firms.   
2. Data and Methodology 
We use Compustat Annual Industrial and Compustat Business segment as the two main sources 
of data to collect information on firms‟ characteristics for the analysis. Initially the sample is 
constructed based on U.S. companies which have annual sales of at least $20 million for the 
sample period of 1994-2009. Firms with any segment operating in the utility (SIC codes 4900-
4999) or financial sectors (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded. We require the firms to have 
information of the key variable available in both the Compustat Annual Industrial and Compustat 
Business Segment database. The discussion on the key variables and sources of data are 
presented below.  
Measure of Geographic Dispersion 
Based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis‟ nine census regions in the United States, a firm is 
geographically dispersed if it has subsidiaries located in more than one region. To get 
information on the locations of firms‟ subsidiaries, we use the data of Dyreng et al. (2013), they 
created their database by developing a text search program to extract lists and names of the 
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locations of significant subsidiaries the firms have in the U.S. from the filings submitted to 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
1
  
Measure of Industrial and Global Diversification 
A firm-year is defined as industrially diversified if it operates in more than one industry defined 
by the 4-digit level of standard industrial classification (SIC) code. Also globally diversified 
firms are the ones which report any level of operations outside the United States. 
Cost of bank debt 
We follow the literature which employs the loan spread over LIBOR charged by the banks at the 
period of loan origination as a measure of the cost of bank debt. The source of data is the Loan 
Pricing Corporation‟s (LPC) DealScan database, in which the variable “All-in-Drawn” shows the 
amount the borrower pays over LIBOR in basis points for each dollar drawn down.  The 
logarithm of the “All-in-Drawn” is used as the measure of cost of bank debt in this paper.  
 
3. Empirical Findings of the Paper 
3.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1, panel A, shows the summary statistics of the firms‟ characteristics using firm year level 
data. Essentially, we compare the mean values of different attributes of all concentrated firms 
with the values of firms with different organizational forms. Column 1 presents the mean values 
of key firm characteristics of all concentrated firms. Columns 2 to 8 represent the differences in 
mean values of the attributes of other organizational forms compared to the attributes of all 
                                                          
1
 We are thankful to Scott Dyreng for providing us the opportunity to utilize his data. 
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concentrated firms. We describe the definitions of different forms of organizations in detail in  
appendix A. Compared to “All concentrated firms”, from column 2 we can see that “Only 
diversified firms” are significantly larger and more leveraged, although they hold a less amount 
of cash. All firm attributes except the cash holding and return volatility are significantly higher 
for the firms which are “Only geographically dispersed”. “Only globally diversified firms”, as 
(shown in column 4) which are significantly larger, have higher market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, Z-score, and ROA. Also, they seem significantly less risky than “All concentrated 
firms” as the value of return volatility indicates. We can detect some systematic patterns 
observing the characteristics of the firms across the groups of organizational forms. The largest 
firms are the ones which are under the group of “All diversified”.  
Panel B of table 1 shows the loan characteristics using loan-year level data. Column 1 shows the 
mean values of different loan characteristics. Differences between the mean values of column 1 
and mean values of firms under different organizational forms are shown from column 2 to 8. 
We can see in the first row of panel B that, except for the group of all concentrated firms, the 
cost of loans for the all concentrated firms is significantly higher than any other group of firms. 
On the other hand, loan size is higher for all types of diversified firms. Security requirement is 
found to be more demanded for all concentrated firms.    
3.2. Results from the Multivariate Analysis 
To examine the effect of different organizational forms on the cost of bank debt, initially we 
regress the loan spread on the various dummy variables capturing the type of organizations and 
variables representing the characteristics of firms and loans.  
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To control firm characteristics, we use the natural logarithm of the firm‟s total assets as “Size” as 
a control variable  since larger firms are more likely to end up with more favorable loan contracts 
due to less severity of the problem of information asymmetry associated with their operations. 
“Leverage” is to control firm‟s current status of the usage of debt, which should be positively 
associated with the probability of bankruptcy and the borrowing cost. On the other hand, another 
employed control variable is “ROA”, as higher value of return on asset is likely to lower the 
default risk and the cost of borrowing.  The variable “Tangibility” is to control the firm‟s ability 
to obtain capital with a lower cost because of the higher recovery rates associated with the 
tangible assets. We include M/B, the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets to 
capture firms‟ growth opportunities. The variable “Return volatility” is expected to be positively 
correlated with the cost of debt as it works as the proxy to measure firms‟ riskiness. We also 
include  “Z-score” which is the Altman‟s z-score to control default risk.  
We also control for the loan characteristics which are important for the cost of bank lending. 
Natural logarithm of the loan amount is “Log (Loan Size)”, which is supposed to be negatively 
related with the loan rate reflecting the economics of scale associated with the amount of bank 
loan. We include the natural logarithm of the maturity of loan as expressed by months, which 
should be positively related with the loan rate because there is an inverse association between the 
liquidity and the durations of debt. The variable “Security dummy” is the variable with value 1 if 
the loan is secured, and 0 otherwise. “Syndication dummy”  equals one if the loan is syndicated, 
otherwise the value is zero.    
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Table 1: Summer Statistics 
The data set has 10,636 firm-year observations and 16,704 loan-year observations for the period of 1994-2009. Panel A and B show the firm and loan 
characteristics of the firms with different organizational forms respectively.  All variables are defined in appendix A. Column 1 shows the mean values of 
the variables of “All concentrated” firms. The mean values of the variables of other organizational forms is subtracted from the values of corresponding 
variables of “All concentrated” firms and the differences are presented in the columns 2 to 8. The significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by 
*, **, and ***, respectively. 
  Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
 Mean value Differences in mean values of different groups of firms compared to all concentrated firms 
 (1) 
All 
concentrated 
(2) 
Only 
industrially 
diversified 
(3) 
Only 
geographically 
dispersed 
firms 
 
(4) 
Only globally 
diversified 
(5) 
Both 
geographically 
dispersed and 
industrially 
diversified 
(6) 
Both 
industrially 
and globally 
diversified 
(7) 
Both 
geographically 
dispersed and 
globally 
diversified 
(8) 
All 
diversified 
Total assets 792.600 -884.100*** -1743.500*** -445.400*** -4117.300*** -3556.6*** -2544.900*** -6373.900*** 
Leverage 0.282 -0.064*** -0.047*** 0.012 -0.047*** -0.009 -0.002 0.002 
M/B 1.816 0.199 0.195*** -0.149** 0.271*** 0.102 -0.065 0.109** 
Profitability 0.065 -0.035 -0.062*** -0.034*** -0.065*** -0.051*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
Tangibility 0.385 0.041** -0.006 0.091*** 0.053*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.109*** 
Z-score 0.956 -0.401 -0.570** -0.458*** -0.860*** -0.567*** -0.814*** -0.899*** 
Return 
volatility 
0.167 0.002 0.032*** 0.015*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.057*** 
ROA 0.065 -0.035 -0.062*** -0.034*** -0.065*** -0.051*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
Cash holding 0.103 0.029*** 0.037*** -0.010* 0.052*** 0.022*** 0.004 0.033*** 
Number of 
observations 
927 280 949 2492 545 1100 2203 2140 
Percentages 
of total firm-
year 
observations 
0.087 0.026 0.089 0.234 0.051 0.103 0.207 0.201 
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  Panel B: Loan Characteristics 
 Mean value Differences in mean values of different groups of firms compared to all concentrated firms 
 (1) 
All 
concentrated 
(2) 
Only 
industrially 
diversified 
(3) 
Only 
geographically 
dispersed 
firms 
 
(4) 
Only 
globally 
diversified 
(5) 
Both 
geographically 
dispersed and 
industrially 
diversified 
(6) 
Both 
industrially 
and 
globally 
diversified 
(7) 
Both 
geographically 
dispersed and 
globally 
diversified 
(8) 
All 
diversified 
Loan spread 244.200 -6.126 30.570*** 27.689*** 42.952*** 66.661*** 73.176*** 94.520*** 
Loan size 109.200 -16.562 -175.200*** -17.873* -218.00*** -187.20*** -191.900*** -412.10*** 
Loan 
maturity 
43.918 -1.711 -4.654*** 1.692** -4.813*** -0.824 -3.128*** -0.388 
Syndication 
dummy 
0.842 -0.056*** -0.127*** 0.098*** -0.128*** -0.053*** -0.088*** -0.116*** 
Covenant 3.648 -0.255* -0.170* 0.694*** -0.463*** 0.550*** 0.238*** 0.683*** 
Security 
dummy 
0.726 0.009 0.088*** 0.079*** 0.164*** 0.202*** 0.225*** 0.329*** 
Number of 
observations 
1340 442 1512 3826 912 1772 3478 3422 
Percentages 
of total loan-
year 
observations 
0.080 0.026 0.091 0.229 0.055 0.106 0.208 0.205 
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“Leverage” is to control firm‟s current status of the usage of debt, which should be positively 
associated with the probability of bankruptcy and the borrowing cost. On the other hand, another 
employed control variable is “ROA”, as higher value of return on asset is likely to lower the 
default risk and the cost of borrowing.  The variable “Tangibility” is to control the firm‟s ability 
to obtain capital with a lower cost because of the higher recovery rates associated with the 
tangible assets. We include M/B, the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets to 
capture firms‟ growth opportunities. The variable “Return volatility” is expected to be positively 
correlated with the cost of debt as it works as the proxy to measure firms‟ riskiness. We also 
include  “Z-score” which is the Altman‟s z-score to control default risk.  
We also control for the loan characteristics which are important for the cost of bank lending. 
Natural logarithm of the loan amount is “Log (Loan Size)”, which is supposed to be negatively 
related with the loan rate reflecting the economics of scale associated with the amount of bank 
loan. We include the natural logarithm of the maturity of loan as expressed by months, which 
should be positively related with the loan rate because there is an inverse association between the 
liquidity and the durations of debt. The variable “Security dummy” is the variable with value 1 if 
the loan is secured, and 0 otherwise. “Syndication dummy” equals one if the loan is syndicated, 
otherwise the value is zero.    
 
3.2.1. Organizational Forms and the Cost of Bank Loan 
In table 2, we include only the three categories of organizational forms to see their effect on loan 
spread. The forms are geographic dispersion, industrial diversification, and global 
diversification, which have been used extensively in the previous literature. In column 1, after 
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controlling for the variables of firms characteristics, we find that there is a highly significant 
negative relationship between the internationalization and the cost of bank loan. The results also 
indicate that firms which are larger, more stable and less levered, holding fewer amounts of cash 
and more tangible assets are associated with a lower cost of bank debt. 
We further control for loan characteristics which are supposed to contain considerable 
relationships with the cost of debt and present the results in the column 2 of table 2. The results 
show that after controlling for loan characteristics, the significant negative impact of global 
diversification on the price of debt still persists. Also the effect of geographic dispersion 
becomes more obvious with the finding of a significant positive coefficient.  In column 3, we 
further control for loan types and loan purposes, which have little impact on the significance and 
magnitude of the geographic and global diversification to change.  
Once we control for industry and year effects, the direction of the effects of geographic 
dispersion and internationalization becomes reversed, that is, the results in column 4 show that 
the cost of bank loan is affected negatively by the dispersion in the location of subsidiaries and 
positively by internationalization. But none of the three diversification measures used in the 
regression are significant. To have a more precise view on the relationship between the measures 
of diversification and the cost of debt, we control for the firm fixed effects in the regression, the  
results are presented in the column 5. We find that internationalization positively and 
significantly affects the loan spread, although the other two measures of diversification do not 
produce any notable effects.  
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Table 2: Organizational forms and the cost of bank loan 
The table presents the regression results on the relationship between organizational forms and the cost of bank 
loan. The dependent variable is Log(loan spread) in all specifications. All variables are defined in appendix A. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within firm clustering and are reported in parentheses. 
Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 1 2 3 4                          5 
Measures of organizational forms 
Geographic 
dispersion 
0.037* 
(0.021) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.031** 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.021) 
Industrial 
diversification 
-0.008 
(0.022 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
0.008 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
0.019 
(0.026) 
Global 
diversification 
-0.191*** 
(0.020) 
-0.153*** 
(0.016) 
-0.116*** 
(0.015) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.077*** 
(0.025) 
Firm characteristics      
Log(Assets) -0.207*** 
(0.008) 
-0.066*** 
(0.010) 
-0.073*** 
(0.009) 
-0.065*** 
(0.009) 
-0.103*** 
(0.018) 
Leverage 0.919*** 
(0.062) 
0.668*** 
(0.051) 
0.511*** 
(0.048) 
0.528*** 
(0.050) 
0.523*** 
(0.067) 
Tangibility -0.178*** 
(0.049) 
-0.129*** 
(0.041) 
-0.053 
(0.035) 
-0.205*** 
(0.044) 
-0.241** 
(0.126) 
Cash holding 0.524*** 
(0.105) 
0.381*** 
(0.090) 
0.241*** 
(0.079) 
0.021 
(0.066) 
0.129 
(0.114) 
ROA -0.196*** 
(0.158) 
-0.173 
(0.120) 
-0.177* 
(0.104) 
-0.315*** 
(0.092) 
-0.453*** 
(0.150) 
M/B -0.114 
(0.024) 
-0.088*** 
(0.020) 
-0.079*** 
(0.015) 
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.016) 
Return volatility 2.274*** 
(0.134) 
1.761*** 
(0.109) 
1.711*** 
(0.099) 
1.067*** 
(0.089) 
0.747*** 
(0.112) 
Z-score -0.016*** 
(0.009) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
Loan characteristics      
Log(Loan size)  -0.123*** 
(0.009) 
-0.098*** 
(0.008) 
-0.099*** 
(0.007) 
-0.086*** 
(0.008) 
Log(Loan Maturity)  0.083*** 
(0.011) 
-0.088*** 
(0.013) 
-0.060*** 
(0.012) 
-0.048*** 
(0.013) 
Security dummy  0.559*** 
(0.017) 
0.466*** 
(0.015) 
0.403*** 
(0.014) 
0.252*** 
(0.018) 
Syndication dummy  0.046** 
(0.021) 
0.065*** 
(0.019) 
-0.057*** 
(0.018) 
-0.054** 
(0.024) 
Constant 6.088*** 
(0.075) 
5.121*** 
(0.077) 
5.450*** 
(0.069) 
4.854*** 
(0.117) 
5.093*** 
(0.216) 
Control for      
Loan purposes, and 
loan types 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Credit rating No No No Yes Yes 
Year  effects No No No Yes Yes 
Industry effects No No No Yes N.A. 
Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes 
Observations 16,704 16,704 16,704 16,541 16,606 
Adjusted R2 0.446 0.548 0.615 0.687 0.794 
 
From table 2, we can at least identify the importance of global diversification in the increase of 
the cost of debt after controlling for industry or firm fixed effects. However, geographic 
dispersion and industrial diversification fail to produce any significant relationship. On the other 
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hand, from table 1, we can see that a large number of firms which are geographically diversified 
are also globally or industrially diversified, which is also true for other types of firms. In the 
presence of firms that are diversified in multiple ways we cannot ignore the combined effects of 
diversification such as industrially and globally diversified, or geographically dispersed and 
industrially diversified. Also after controlling for the combined effects of diversification it would 
be possible to single out the individual diversification effect. 
We include all combinations of diversification in the regression and present the results in table 3. 
In Column 1 of the table, we only control for firm characteristics and find that all combinations 
of diversification except “Only industrial diversification” significantly affect the cost of bank 
loans. While “Only geographic dispersion” affects the cost of debt positively, the other types of 
diversification or combinations of diversification such as “Only global diversification”, or “Both 
geographic and global diversification”, or “Geographic dispersion, industrial, and global 
diversification”   are positively related with cost of debt. The story remains the same even after 
controlling for variables capturing the loan characteristics as shown in Column 2. In the last 
column of Table 3, we present the results from the regression where we further control for 
industry and year effects. Similar to what we have experienced in Table 2 once the effects of 
industry and year are controlled for, we can see the reversion in direction and the loss of 
significance of the effects of diversification. The only type of diversification measure which 
affects the cost of debt positively and significantly is “Only global diversification”. The other 
type of organizational form leaving significant impact is “Only geographic dispersion”, shown  
as positive in all specifications of Table 3.  
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Table 3: All combinations of organizational forms and the cost of bank loan 
The table presents the regression results on the relationship between all combinations of organizational forms and the cost of bank 
loan. The dependent variable is Log(loan spread) in all specifications. All variables are defined in appendix A. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within firm clustering and are reported in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 1 2 3 
Measures of organizational forms 
Only geographic dispersion 0.131*** 
(0.034) 
0.102*** 
(0.030) 
0.043* 
(0.024) 
Only industrial diversification -0.029 
(0.042) 
-0.030 
(0.039) 
0.012 
(0.033) 
Only global diversification -0.134*** 
(0.030) 
-0.112*** 
(0.027) 
0.073*** 
(0.023) 
Both geographic dispersion and industrial 
diversification 
0.084* 
(0.045) 
0.078** 
(0.037) 
0.031 
(0.030) 
Both geographic dispersion and global 
diversification 
-0.131*** 
(0.032) 
-0.102*** 
(0.027) 
0.038 
(0.024) 
Both industrial and global diversification -0.138*** 
(0.038) 
-0.123*** 
(0.033) 
0.044 
(0.028) 
Geographic dispersion, industrial, and global 
diversification 
-0.121*** 
(0.038) 
-0.088*** 
(0.032) 
0.047* 
(0.026) 
Firm Characteristics    
Log(Assets)  -0.208*** 
(0.008) 
-0.066*** 
(0.010) 
-0.065*** 
(0.009) 
Leverage 0.919*** 
(0.062) 
0.669*** 
(0.051) 
0.528*** 
(0.050) 
Tangibility -0.178*** 
(0.049) 
-0.129*** 
(0.041) 
-0.204*** 
(0.043) 
Cash holding 0.528*** 
(0.104) 
0.385*** 
(0.089) 
0.023 
(0.066) 
ROA -0.198 
(0.158) 
-0.174 
(0.120) 
-0.315*** 
(0.092) 
M/B -0.114*** 
(0.024) 
-0.088*** 
(0.019) 
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
Return volatility 2.285*** 
(0.134) 
1.770*** 
(0.110) 
1.069*** 
(0.089) 
Z-score -0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Loan characteristics    
Log(Loan size)  -0.123*** 
(0.009) 
-0.099*** 
(0.007) 
Log(Loan maturity)  0.083*** 
(0.010) 
-0.060*** 
(0.012) 
Security dummy  0.558*** 
(0.017) 
0.402*** 
(0.014) 
Syndication dummy  0.049** 
(0.021) 
-0.054*** 
(0.018) 
Constant 6.045*** 
(0.076) 
5.091*** 
(0.079) 
4.817*** 
(0.116) 
Control for    
Loan purposes, and loan types No No Yes 
Credit rating No No Yes 
Year  effects No No Yes 
Industry effects No No Yes 
Observations 16,704 16,704 16,541 
Adjusted R2 0.446 0.548 0.688 
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3.2.2. Organizational Forms and Non-price Bank Loan Terms 
As the literature suggests that non-price terms like short-term maturity or requirement of 
collateral are the components of indirect costs to be incurred by the borrowers (Graham et al., 
2008; Smith and Warner, 1979), we also study the impact of organizational forms on the non-
price bank contracts. 
Maturity of Loan 
The maturity of a loan is an important non-price contract which is negatively related with the 
liquidity and bargaining capability of the firms. Also the agency costs of debt associated with the 
compensation scheme can be controlled by employing the short-term debt (Brockman et al., 
2010). We include the natural logarithm of the maturity of loan as a dependent variable as a fixed 
affects regression model and observe whether the organizational forms have to play any 
significant role to influence them. Column 1 in Table 4 shows that any combination of 
organizational forms other than firms under the category of “Only global diversification” are 
likely to increase the loan maturity. The other important findings are that the firm size, cash 
holding, and volatility are negatively related with the loan maturity, whereas the leverage, 
tangibility, Z-score, ROA, loan size, and syndication of loan affect the maturity of loan 
positively. 
 
Requirement of Security 
We employ a probit model to observe the likelihood of the requirement of the security associated 
with the types of organizations. Security dummy is a dependent variable with value 1 if the loan  
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Table 4: Organizational forms and non-price loan terms 
The table presents the OLS and probit regression results on the relationship between all combinations of 
organizational forms and non-price loan terms. Column 1 and 3 show the OLS regression results using Log(Loan 
maturity) and Covenant respectively as the dependent variables. Column 2 uses the Security dummy as dependent 
variable and employs probit model. All variables are defined in appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and within firm clustering and are reported in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  (1) 
Log(Loan maturity) 
(2) 
Security 
(3) 
Covenant 
Measures of organizational forms 
Only geographic dispersion 0.015 
(0.021) 
0.013 
(0.084) 
0.012 
(0.033) 
Only industrial diversification 0.013 
(0.033) 
0.032 
(0.117) 
0.017 
(0.046) 
Only global diversification -0.003 
(0.020) 
0.095 
(0.077) 
-0.016 
(0.029) 
Both geographic dispersion 
and industrial diversification 
0.011 
(0.026) 
-0.089 
(0.101) 
0.083** 
(0.040) 
Both geographic dispersion 
and global diversification 
0.016 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.077) 
0.084*** 
(0.029) 
Both industrial and global 
diversification 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.119 
(0.086) 
0.010 
(0.033) 
All forms of diversification 0.003 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.082) 
0.035 
(0.032) 
Firm characteristics    
Log(Assets)  -0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.249*** 
(0.021) 
-0.058*** 
(0.010) 
Leverage 0.058** 
(0.029) 
0.910*** 
(0.111) 
-0.061 
(0.042) 
Tangibility 0.042 
(0.031) 
-0.307 
(0.124) 
0.052 
(0.050) 
Cash holding -0.142*** 
(0.052) 
-0.157 
(0.184) 
-0.262*** 
(0.075) 
ROA 0.117* 
(0.062) 
-1.019*** 
(0.284) 
0.193** 
(0.094) 
M/B -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.057*** 
(0.020) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
Return volatility -0.358*** 
(0.076) 
2.692*** 
(0.360) 
-0.157 
(0.103) 
Z-score 0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.030 
(0.020) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Loan characteristics    
Log(Loan size) 0.077*** 
(0.006) 
-0.094*** 
(0.019) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Log(Loan maturity)  0.055* 
(0.032) 
0.032** 
(0.015) 
Security dummy 0.011 
(0.010) 
 0.563*** 
(0.019) 
Syndication dummy 0.177*** 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.056) 
0.211*** 
(0.024) 
Constant 1.999*** 
(0.090) 
0.242 
(0.360) 
-0.370*** 
(0.147) 
Control for    
Loan purposes, and loan types Yes Yes Yes 
Credit rating Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,541 16,510 16,541 
Adjusted R2 0.641  0.415 
Pseudo R2  0.316  
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is secured, and zero otherwise. The results in Column 2 of Table 4 show that firms under the 
categories of “Both geographic dispersion and industrial diversification” and “Both geographic 
dispersion and global diversification” are less likely to face the requirement of security. 
Although none of effects of the types of diversification on the requirement of security are 
significant.  
Covenant 
Covenant requirement is another important non-price term for the banks to deal with potential 
agency problems created by borrowers. We follow Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) to calculate the 
covenant intensity in a loan facility as the natural logarithm of one plus total number of 
covenants, or as Log(1 + Covenant). From the OLS regression using Log(1 + Covenant) as the 
dependent variable, the results in Column 3 of Table 4 indicate that although firms which are 
only geographically dispersed do not experience any significant effect in their covenant 
requirement associated with loan facility, the types of organizational forms as the combination of 
geographic dispersion with industrial diversification or with global diversification are 
significantly and positively associated with covenant requirements. The result implies that banks 
impose higher requirements of covenants when the firms are diversified at multiple levels.  
3.2.3. Robustness Tests 
From the previous regressions it becomes evident that types and combinations of organizational 
forms do matter for the bank loan contract, we cannot ignore the possibility of unobservable firm 
characteristics in affecting the terms of bank loan contracts. After controlling for firm fixed 
effects, the result in Column 1 of table 5 shows that the positive effect of “Only global 
diversification” on loan spread increases from 0.073 to 0.145 which is economically and  
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Table 5: Robustness tests 
The table shows the robustness tests of the effect of organizational forms on the cost of bank debt. The Log(loan spread) is used as 
the dependent variable in all specifications of regressions in the table. All variables are defined in appendix. Column 1 shows the 
results of firm-fixed effect regression. Column 2 shows the results of OLS regression using a reduced sample consists of only the 
largest facility per firm year.  Column 3 is the two-stage least square regression using asset maturity as the instrument variable to 
control for the potential problem of endogeneity associated with debt maturity. In all regressions, standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and within firm clustering and are reported in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  (1) 
Firm Fixed Effect 
(2) 
Firm-year level 
(3) 
Instrument for loan maturity 
Measures of organizational forms 
Only geographic dispersion 0.038 
(0.039) 
0.030 
(0.024) 
0.042* 
(0.024) 
Only industrial diversification 0.048 
(0.050) 
0.019 
(0.032) 
0.011 
(0.033) 
Only global diversification 0.145*** 
(0.037) 
0.065*** 
(0.023) 
0.074*** 
(0.023) 
Both geographic dispersion and 
industrial diversification 
0.088 
(0.047) 
0.018 
(0.031) 
0.031 
(0.030) 
Both geographic dispersion and global 
diversification 
0.096** 
(0.039) 
0.041* 
(0.024) 
0.038 
(0.024) 
Both industrial and global 
diversification 
0.110** 
(0.048) 
0.043 
(0.027) 
0.044 
(0.028) 
Geographic dispersion, industrial, and 
global diversification 
0.131*** 
(0.043) 
0.036 
(0.026) 
0.048* 
(0.026) 
Firm characteristics    
Log(Assets)  -0.102*** 
(0.018) 
-0.096*** 
(0.009) 
-0.065*** 
(0.009) 
Leverage 0.524*** 
(0.067) 
0.524*** 
(0.053) 
0.525*** 
(0.050) 
Tangibility -0.236* 
(0.125) 
-0.193*** 
(0.043) 
-0.207*** 
(0.044) 
Cash holding 0.137 
(0.114) 
-0.036 
(0.063) 
0.030 
(0.066) 
ROA -0.454*** 
(0.151) 
-0.217*** 
(0.078) 
-0.321*** 
(0.094) 
M/B -0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.046*** 
(0.010) 
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
Return volatility 0.747*** 
(0.111) 
0.995*** 
(0.082) 
1.100*** 
(0.091) 
Z-score -0.014 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Loan characteristics    
Log(Loan size) -0.086*** 
(0.008) 
-0.085*** 
(0.009) 
-0.103*** 
(0.007) 
Log(Loan maturity) -0.048*** 
(0.013) 
-0.103*** 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
Security dummy 0.251*** 
(0.018) 
0.386*** 
(0.014) 
0.401*** 
(0.014) 
Syndication dummy -0.051** 
(0.024) 
-0.071*** 
(0.020) 
-0.064*** 
(0.018) 
Constant 5.040*** 
(0.219) 
5.109*** 
(0.112) 
4.739*** 
(0.357) 
Control for    
Loan purposes, and loan types Yes Yes Yes 
Credit rating Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects N.A. Yes Yes 
Observations 16,605 10,548 16,530 
Adjusted R2 0.794 0.702 0.687 
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statistically significant. Also the positive effect of “Geographic dispersion, industrially, and 
globally diversification” gets stronger once the firm fixed effects are taken in to consideration, 
which increases from 0.047 to 0.131.  
Since our basic unit of analysis is a loan facility where the borrowers usually receive several 
intercorrelated loan facilities under the negotiation of a loan package, there is a possibility of 
interdependence among the facilities especially for the deals that consist of several loan facilities 
received by the same borrowers in the same year. Therefore, the problem of biased estimation 
might be raised from treating the loans as independent while they are actually correlated with 
each other. To deal with this problem, standard errors are adjusted for within-firm clustering in 
all regression specifications used in this study. In addition of doing that, we create a reduced 
sample which only consists of the largest facility obtained by each firm-year and conduct the test 
again, the results are presented in column 2 of table 5. We find significant positive effects of the 
firms which are “Only globally diversified” on the loan spread to persist, also the firms with the 
organizational forms of “Both geographic dispersion and global diversification” contain notable 
effects on the cost of debt.  
Finally, another issue of endogeneity may come from the use of loan maturity as an independent 
variable and the loan spread as the dependent variable in the regression, where it can be possible 
that the loan maturity and loan spread are determined simultaneously. We deal with this issue by 
employing a two-stage least square regression. In the first stage the debt maturity is regressed on 
a firm‟s asset maturity and then the predicted value of debt maturity is used on the right hand 
side of the second stage regression. We find that the types of organizational forms which plays 
significant roles throughout the study also remain economically and statistically significant after 
controlling for the endogeneity of loan maturity, as column 3 of table 5 shows. 
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 4. Conclusion 
This paper is the first to show the importance of the combinations of different organizational 
forms in influencing the cost of bank loan. We include the types of diversification such as only 
global diversification, only industrial diversification, only geographic dispersion, both industrial 
and global diversification, both industrial diversification and geographic dispersion, both global 
diversification and geographic dispersion, and all diversified as geographic, industrial, and global 
diversification in our empirical specifications which have the advantage of capturing the effect of 
each individual combination of diversification on the cost of bank debt. We find that firms which 
are only globally diversified experience a higher cost of bank loan. Also the firms which are only 
geographically dispersed or diversified geographically, globally, and industrially receive less 
favorable treatment from the banks. Our results indicate that non-price terms, such as the 
covenant requirement, is higher for the firms which are both geographically and globally 
diversified, or both geographically and industrially diversified. 
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Appendix A 
Regional Classification 
Atlantic Coast Delaware New England Connecticut 
District of Columbia Massachusetts 
Florida Maine 
Georgia New Hampshire 
Maryland Rhode Island 
North Carolina Vermont 
South Carolina Plains Iowa 
Virginia Kansas 
West Virginia Minnesota 
Deep South Alabama Missouri 
Kentucky North Dakota 
Mississippi Nebraska 
Tennessee South Dakota 
Midwest Illinois Sothern Plains Arkansas 
Indiana Louisiana 
Michigan Oklahoma 
Ohio Texas 
Wisconsin West Coast California 
Mountain Arizona Oregon 
Colorado Washington 
Idaho Hawaii 
Montana Alaska 
New Mexico Middle Atlantic New Jersey 
Nevada New York 
Utah Pennsylvania 
Wyoming 
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Appendix B 
Variable Definition 
Measures of organizational forms  
All concentrated Dummy variable equals to on if firms are not industrially, globally and 
geographically diversified, and zero otherwise. 
Industrial diversification Dummy variable equals to one if firms have segments operating in multiple 
industries defined by different 4-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. 
Geographic dispersion Dummy variable equals to one if firms have subsidiaries located to more than one 
region in the United States, and zero otherwise. 
Global diversification Dummy variable equals to one if firms report of any segment operating in foreign 
countries, and zero otherwise. 
Only industrially diversified Dummy variable equals to one if the firms are only industrially diversified, 
neither globally diversified nor geographically dispersed, and zero otherwise. 
Only geographically dispersed Dummy variable equals to one if the firms are only geographically dispersed, 
neither globally diversified nor industrially diversified, and zero otherwise. 
Only globally diversified Dummy variable equals to one if the firms are only globally diversified, neither 
geographically dispersed nor industrially diversified, and zero otherwise. 
Both geographically dispersed 
and industrially diversified 
Dummy variable equals to one if the firms are geographically dispersed and 
industrially diversified, not internationally diversified, and zero otherwise. 
Both industrially and globally 
diversified 
Dummy variable equals to one if the firms are internationally and industrially 
diversified, not geographically dispersed, and zero otherwise. 
Both geographically dispersed 
and globally diversified 
Dummy variable equals to one if the firms are geographically dispersed 
internationally diversified, not industrially diversified, and zero otherwise. 
All diversified Dummy variable equals to one if the firms are industrially and globally 
diversified, and geographically dispersed. 
Firm characteristics 
Log(Assets) The natural logarithm of firm‟s total assets. 
Leverage The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets 
Tangibility Net property, plant and equity divided by total assets 
Cash holding Cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets 
ROA Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by total assets 
M/B Ratio of market value of assets to book value of asset 
Return volatility The standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year prior to the loan 
initiation year 
Z-score Following Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), the modified Altman‟s (1968) Z-score = 
1.2*Working capital + 1.4*Retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT + 0.999*Sales)/Total 
assets. 
Asset maturity Asset maturity = 
(PPE/(CA+PPE))*(PPE/Depreciation)+(CA/(CA+PPE))*(CA/COGS), where 
PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment, CA = current assets, and COGS = 
cost of goods sold. 
Loan characteristics  
Loan spread It is the amount the borrowed pays in basis points in excess of LIBOR for each 
dollar drawn down. 
Loan size Total amount of loan facility (in million US $) 
Loan maturity The duration of loan facility in number of months 
Syndication Dummy variable equals to one if the loan is syndicated, and zero otherwise 
Covenant Total number of covenants in a loan facility 
Security Dummy variable equals to one if loan is secured, and zero otherwise. 
Loan purpose Dummy variable for loan purposes, including corporate purposes, debt 
repayment, working capital, acquisitions, etc. 
Loan type Dummy variable for loan types, including term loan, 364-day facility, revolver 
greater than one year, revolver less than one year, etc. 
Debt rating Dummy variable for S&P senior debt rating, such as AAA, AA, etc. 
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